Political Calculations

The sensation of this election season has been John McCain's decision to ask Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska to be his running mate on the Republican presidential ticket. In the days following McCain's announcement, the blogosphere and traditional media went on a rampage, delving into Palin's personal life with unprecedented ferocity and vitriol. They were attempting to prove her unfit for national office.

Aside from distaste at their focus, which might have been more fruitfully deployed against Palin's extreme positions on abortion, gay rights, and creationism in schools (save perhaps that she never made those positions part of her efforts while governing), the feeding frenzy barreled past a huge signal of McCain's priorities for his administration: energy policy.

Palin's reputation is that of a maverick and reformer, complimenting McCain's own. In her short time in office, she took on major oil companies, contrary to the assumption that Republicans are always in the pocket of big business. She brokered a deal between multiple stakeholders, including federal, provincial, and tribal governments and businesses, to build a new gas pipeline from Alaska to the continental United States. Her time as chairman of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission gives her experience in the development and economics of oil fields, and knowledge of petroleum's limitations. Her acceptance speech at the GOP convention presented a sophisticated analysis of the linkages between energy sources and recent foreign policy crisis points.

Apart from pipelines in the Caucuses, the perennial issue of Islamic extremism in the Middle East, and Venezuelan intransigence, high oil prices have driven much of the recent economic slowdown in the United States (the other major factor being, of course, the collapse of credit markets based on risky loans). Pain at the pumps, rising transportation costs, leading to higher food prices – all of it contributes to a perception of recession and a certain level of helplessness.

Ongoing discussions within the military and foreign policy communities have convinced me that dependence on oil – the underpinning of the world economy since Nixon took American currency off the gold standard – dictates American engagement in the Middle East. We are in Iraq, we support Saudi Arabia, because they have petroleum. Our presence there aggravates factionalism and Islamic fundamentalism with tragic results. The events of September 11th, seven years ago tomorrow, showed the consequences.

Petroleum reserves are finite; estimates vary on their duration, but efforts must accelerate a transition to alternate sources of energy, with a side benefit of environmental protection. Wind power, hydroelectric, solar, hydrogen fuel cells, conversion of non-food plants to ethanol – there are many options, but the best one or mix of sources has yet to be determined.

Palin's nomination undoubtedly arose from a calculus of multiple issues. She assuages concerns of the religious right and socially conservative Republicans that McCain is too moderate. She's an outsider to the elites of Washington in a year when public opinion is disgusted with Congress. She has a record of reform against corruption, even against members of her party. She's a woman from a small town who began her political career in the PTA, appealing to middle America and certain other demographics.

But don't discount the fact of her experience with energy issues in McCain's decision. To me, it indicates that he is serious about shifting America away from petroleum. It won't happen next year or the year after that, which explains the enthusiasm for offshore drilling among Republicans. Yet eventually, in the long term, the United States should be in a much better position with regard to energy. And that will increase the flexibility of our foreign policy immensely, allowing us, perhaps, to leave the Middle East to its own devices and move onward to a brighter future.

Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East

Author: Etel Solingen, University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Panelists: Doyle McManus, Washington Bureau Chief for the Los Angeles Times, Gary Samore, Council on Foreign Relations (National Security Council 1995-2001), and an official with the U.S. intelligence community

When: Thursday 24 January 2008
Where: University of California Washington Center, Rhode Island Avenue, Washington DC

Attempting to answer the question: Why have some states opted for nuclear weapons while others have renounced them?

Solingen's remarks:

Conventional wisdom is less applicable than commonly believed. She mentioned Argentina, South Africa, and Brazil as countries that joined the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in the 1990s after pursuing (and in South Africa's case, obtaining) nuclear weapons, which are said to enhance power, ensure survival, and add caution to international relations. She believes this view overpredicts proliferation, and went on to list empirical anomalies with neorealist theory with regard to nuclear weapons.

• Insecure states do not always go after nuclear weapons


• An external threat isn't a prerequisite for those who do pursue a nuclear capability


• Alliance pressures don't explain the decision to go after or abstain from developing nuclear weapons


• The domestic context of the state is key in alliance success and foreign policy


• Coercion against nuclear-pursuing states does not work to make them abandon their programs


• Overall, neorealism fails to explain too many cases

Her thesis: domestic orientations to the global political economy have important implications for nuclear paths:

• Democracy and openness to international trade provide incentives for economic integration


• There are lower costs for inward-looking regimes to pursue a nuclear capability, as they are suspicious of the international community and focused on domestic growth


• A cooperative regional environment provides for state-level economic growth and makes sanctions more of a threat


• It is necessary to construct a huge nuclear infrastructure complex -- technology, industry, bureaucracy, military -- with funds that would otherwise spur peaceful economic development

Nuclear states are more likely from inward-looking regimes (North Korea vice Japan, Iran vice Jordan), and the protectionism common to the Middle East explains why so many states have had nuclear programs over the past several decades.

Inward-looking states that evolved to international engagement, such as South Africa, Brazil, and Taiwan, have all divested their nuclear programs. Global trade leads to denuclearization as the stakes of condemnation get higher than the benefits of peaceful cooperation. In the cases mentioned, export-led industrialization was beneficial. In the case of autarkic goals, nuclear weapons are still seen as desirable.

Thus, domestic models are crucial to explain nuclear policy. They are filters through which leaders define security and provide a better foundation for non-proliferation aimed policy.

McManus' Remarks

He wondered whether a longing for prestige was a driver toward nuclearization, and made a distinction between prestige and respect. France, for instance, desires a place at the great power table, and equality with the world's leaders. Their nuclear arsenal grants them a say in global affairs that otherwise would likely be denied them.

• Loud coercive efforts and harsh penalties tend to strengthen the nuclear-pursuing regime by distracting the populace from domestic concerns (as can be seen in Iran today)


• Silent coercion, through banks, trade sanctions, or veiled threats, tends to refocus the domestic agenda and can result in election upsets, even in states with restricted democratic institutions. This can change the environment sufficiently to make nuclear weapons seem undesirable.


• Question of norms: to what extent do countries want or need to comply with international norms? Referenced Kissinger, Shultz, et al arguments for total nuclear disarmament as an attempt to change the international landscape.

Samore's Remarks

• Noted that realism/structuralism is a very efficient approach to analysis, but agreed that the domestic situation of a state seeking nuclear weapons is key.


• Policy issues:


• North Korea: commented on their determination. Isolationist yet needy for recognition. Not likely to disarm under current regime, yet authoritarian enough to have no democratic process at all. How should the international community proceed?


• Regime change is the most effective instrument for non-proliferation according to this information, but aftermath of Iraq invasion shows drawbacks of approach.


• Is it possible to manage East Asia away from proliferation? There are countries who hedge with a peaceful nuclear capacity, like Taiwan and South Korea, that still grants them the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons. Fuel-cycle technology and uranium enrichment is the major stumbling block. If that's solved, what is to keep these countries from reacting to a changed security dilemma with over nuclearization?


• In the Middle East, Iran is driven by status issues. They have complicated internal dynamics. No united coalition to apply international pressure (cf, Russia and China in the UN Security Council). Again, what can the United States do?

U.S. Intelligence Official's Remarks

He detailed the contributions of the book as two-fold: theoretical and practical.

On the theoretical level:

• Looking beyond monocausal explanations of proliferating behavior.


• How much variable integration was discovered? Look at relationship of security to domestic orientation to technical capabilities.


• Pointed out deficiencies of neo-classical realism.


• Wondered about organizational theory's role in the author's explanations.

On the practical level, he felt that this work provided a critique of current policies, and a point of departure for policy makers. If they have a correct understanding of the forces driving nuclearization, there's at least an improved chance of getting their inducements or punishments to change state behavior. He felt the work debunked commonly accepted wisdom and provides a more accurate picture of real life. In the intelligence community, and much of academia, there's a split between functional and regional expertise. He noted that the case studies and analysis show patterns of domestic behavior across regions, demonstrating that they're not unique.

As to current U.S. policy, trade and globalization efforts make sense in this context. It attacks myths of "great power" status accruing to states pursuing nuclearization, pointing out the pariah status of North Korea as an example. In addition, he said that security incentives or guarantees would hold a weaker position under this theory, making American alliances less effective tools of power.

Questions:

These were the big insights from the question and answer session at the end of the session:

• When asked why she didn't examine India or Pakistan as part of her case study, Solingen replied that she wanted to compare like regions, and both Northeast Asia and the Middle East were multipolar, in comparison to the bi-polar subcontinent (I'd quibble with that a bit, and argue that China plays an enormous role in relations between India and Pakistan, but she's right in that it's not a multipolar environment). But even so, India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974 was at the height of their protectionist era, while they've reduced trade barriers and liberalized their economy now, well after they reached nuclear weapons status.


• Norms were much less explanatory than expected in the Japanese case. More practical considerations ruled their rejection of nuclear weapons, although it was noted that their technical know-how and large civilian nuclear power industry mean it would be only a matter of months if Japan decided to create nuclear weapons.


• Prestige derived from economies is balanced against prestige from nuclear weapons. Democracy vice autarky.


• There has to be a separation between the pre- and post-NPT eras. The UK and France acquired a nuclear capability, while Sweden rejected it in favor of neutrality (a sort of prestige in its own right).


• There can be unintended effects of policy, and it was suggested that one must differentiate between use of nuclear weapons vice acquisition.


• Small numbers of warheads and short timelines ("sprint" breakout capability) dominate proliferation concerns and have a disproportionate impact on world affairs.


• There was a brief discussion of perception and reaction to US government statements that reminded me of strategic communications issues raised by the long war.

On Iraq

I'd been mulling over thoughts about the situation in Iraq, but then a friend linked to this piece by Joseph Lieberman and now I don't have to.

Our Troops Must Stay: America can't abandon 27 million Iraqis to 10,000 terrorists.


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September 11th and Iraq

An article in today’s Washington Post (Antiwar Activists Decry Media's Role in Promoting Pentagon Event), covers objections to news media support for a Department of Defense event “to remember the victims of the Sept. 11 attacks and to support the troops in Iraq.” The article contained a quote from an anti-war activist: “Because they're promoting a lie, that the war in Iraq had anything to do with September 11."

Did Iraq’s leadership, did Saddam Hussein, meet with Osama bin Laden and help plan the September 11th attacks? No. However, Saddam’s hostile regime was directly responsible for the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, one of al Qaeda’s spurs to action. Iraq also continued to rouse Iran’s defensive impulses, causing further build-up of weapons in the region. And Iraq did flout United Nations sanctions to cooperate with weapons inspection teams, as well as international norms prohibiting assassination of national leaders. Iraq was a problem that was not going away prior to September 11th. Instead, leading nations around the world were allowing Iraq to slide back into civilized society, through their inaction over Iraq’s continued and escalating defiance of post-Gulf War rules.

After September 11th, the Bush administration decided to unseat the Taliban in Afghanistan – a worthy cause for reasons other than disrupting al Qaeda operations. Since the Taliban took power in the mid-1990s, they had systematically laid waste to human rights, especially with regard to women, and irreplaceable cultural artifacts. They were barbarians, and it is to the world’s shame that inertia allowed their rule to continue as long as it did. But Afghanistan is only one piece of the Middle East puzzle, a larger problem that involves numerous countries, authoritarian regimes, religious influences, economic stagnation, and the need to educate and employ a restless populace. For years, America was content to support the Saudi monarchy so long as oil continued to flow. That the house of Saud needed to hand over their mosques to Sunni fundamentalists to make the deal palatable was none of our concern. Until two towers collapsed, a wing of the Pentagon crumbled, and a plane’s wreckage burned in a Pennsylvania field.

Of course oil is the basis of American interests in the region. Were it not for oil, the fuel that drives the world economy, the Middle East would hold our attention as much as sub-Saharan Africa, which is to say not much at all. But a geological roll of the dice gifted the area with vital resources, and as preeminent nation in the world, the United States must ensure continued access to oil. To do that, a broader American strategy was put into place, one that could address both the growth of Islamic dissidents, the pool where al Qaeda finds recruits, and also the delicate political-military balance of the region.

Looking at the region after the fall of the Taliban, the next major nexus point was obviously Iraq. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait in 1990, had used chemical weapons on minority Kurds in the late 1980s, had invaded Iran early in the decade, leading to years of warfare and attrition. Negotiations had proven fruitless due to lack Iraqi cooperation – there was no information to indicate that the regime wanted to change internally, and their past history of evading arms control restrictions and creating illegal networks to funnel weapons into the country meant that any proclamation about disarmament was eyed with skepticism.

Given the horrid way the Ba’athist regime treated the Iraqi population, I cannot regret that they were overthrown. That insurgents and malcontents from the former elites proceeded to institute guerilla war was not unexpected, and better planning could certainly have minimized some of the post-invasion bombings and other disturbances. But now that the U.S. is involved in the country, sponsor of a new democratic government, we cannot afford to pull out before stability is achieved. Were we to do so, then the Osama bin Laden’s and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s of the world would sweep in and create another Taliban-era Afghanistan, a place where religious fundamentalists could plot their next attack on the degenerate West.

The war in Iraq definitely had something to do with September 11 – those attacks were America’s wake up call that the status quo in the Middle East could not be permitted to continue.

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Conspiracy Theories

I don't believe in them, most of the time.

http://www.slate.com/id/2121212/

Conspiracy Theories

If you liked The Da Vinci Code, you'll love the Downing Street Memo.
By Christopher Hitchens

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