Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East

Author: Etel Solingen, University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Panelists: Doyle McManus, Washington Bureau Chief for the Los Angeles Times, Gary Samore, Council on Foreign Relations (National Security Council 1995-2001), and an official with the U.S. intelligence community

When: Thursday 24 January 2008
Where: University of California Washington Center, Rhode Island Avenue, Washington DC

Attempting to answer the question: Why have some states opted for nuclear weapons while others have renounced them?

Solingen's remarks:

Conventional wisdom is less applicable than commonly believed. She mentioned Argentina, South Africa, and Brazil as countries that joined the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in the 1990s after pursuing (and in South Africa's case, obtaining) nuclear weapons, which are said to enhance power, ensure survival, and add caution to international relations. She believes this view overpredicts proliferation, and went on to list empirical anomalies with neorealist theory with regard to nuclear weapons.

• Insecure states do not always go after nuclear weapons


• An external threat isn't a prerequisite for those who do pursue a nuclear capability


• Alliance pressures don't explain the decision to go after or abstain from developing nuclear weapons


• The domestic context of the state is key in alliance success and foreign policy


• Coercion against nuclear-pursuing states does not work to make them abandon their programs


• Overall, neorealism fails to explain too many cases

Her thesis: domestic orientations to the global political economy have important implications for nuclear paths:

• Democracy and openness to international trade provide incentives for economic integration


• There are lower costs for inward-looking regimes to pursue a nuclear capability, as they are suspicious of the international community and focused on domestic growth


• A cooperative regional environment provides for state-level economic growth and makes sanctions more of a threat


• It is necessary to construct a huge nuclear infrastructure complex -- technology, industry, bureaucracy, military -- with funds that would otherwise spur peaceful economic development

Nuclear states are more likely from inward-looking regimes (North Korea vice Japan, Iran vice Jordan), and the protectionism common to the Middle East explains why so many states have had nuclear programs over the past several decades.

Inward-looking states that evolved to international engagement, such as South Africa, Brazil, and Taiwan, have all divested their nuclear programs. Global trade leads to denuclearization as the stakes of condemnation get higher than the benefits of peaceful cooperation. In the cases mentioned, export-led industrialization was beneficial. In the case of autarkic goals, nuclear weapons are still seen as desirable.

Thus, domestic models are crucial to explain nuclear policy. They are filters through which leaders define security and provide a better foundation for non-proliferation aimed policy.

McManus' Remarks

He wondered whether a longing for prestige was a driver toward nuclearization, and made a distinction between prestige and respect. France, for instance, desires a place at the great power table, and equality with the world's leaders. Their nuclear arsenal grants them a say in global affairs that otherwise would likely be denied them.

• Loud coercive efforts and harsh penalties tend to strengthen the nuclear-pursuing regime by distracting the populace from domestic concerns (as can be seen in Iran today)


• Silent coercion, through banks, trade sanctions, or veiled threats, tends to refocus the domestic agenda and can result in election upsets, even in states with restricted democratic institutions. This can change the environment sufficiently to make nuclear weapons seem undesirable.


• Question of norms: to what extent do countries want or need to comply with international norms? Referenced Kissinger, Shultz, et al arguments for total nuclear disarmament as an attempt to change the international landscape.

Samore's Remarks

• Noted that realism/structuralism is a very efficient approach to analysis, but agreed that the domestic situation of a state seeking nuclear weapons is key.


• Policy issues:


• North Korea: commented on their determination. Isolationist yet needy for recognition. Not likely to disarm under current regime, yet authoritarian enough to have no democratic process at all. How should the international community proceed?


• Regime change is the most effective instrument for non-proliferation according to this information, but aftermath of Iraq invasion shows drawbacks of approach.


• Is it possible to manage East Asia away from proliferation? There are countries who hedge with a peaceful nuclear capacity, like Taiwan and South Korea, that still grants them the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons. Fuel-cycle technology and uranium enrichment is the major stumbling block. If that's solved, what is to keep these countries from reacting to a changed security dilemma with over nuclearization?


• In the Middle East, Iran is driven by status issues. They have complicated internal dynamics. No united coalition to apply international pressure (cf, Russia and China in the UN Security Council). Again, what can the United States do?

U.S. Intelligence Official's Remarks

He detailed the contributions of the book as two-fold: theoretical and practical.

On the theoretical level:

• Looking beyond monocausal explanations of proliferating behavior.


• How much variable integration was discovered? Look at relationship of security to domestic orientation to technical capabilities.


• Pointed out deficiencies of neo-classical realism.


• Wondered about organizational theory's role in the author's explanations.

On the practical level, he felt that this work provided a critique of current policies, and a point of departure for policy makers. If they have a correct understanding of the forces driving nuclearization, there's at least an improved chance of getting their inducements or punishments to change state behavior. He felt the work debunked commonly accepted wisdom and provides a more accurate picture of real life. In the intelligence community, and much of academia, there's a split between functional and regional expertise. He noted that the case studies and analysis show patterns of domestic behavior across regions, demonstrating that they're not unique.

As to current U.S. policy, trade and globalization efforts make sense in this context. It attacks myths of "great power" status accruing to states pursuing nuclearization, pointing out the pariah status of North Korea as an example. In addition, he said that security incentives or guarantees would hold a weaker position under this theory, making American alliances less effective tools of power.

Questions:

These were the big insights from the question and answer session at the end of the session:

• When asked why she didn't examine India or Pakistan as part of her case study, Solingen replied that she wanted to compare like regions, and both Northeast Asia and the Middle East were multipolar, in comparison to the bi-polar subcontinent (I'd quibble with that a bit, and argue that China plays an enormous role in relations between India and Pakistan, but she's right in that it's not a multipolar environment). But even so, India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974 was at the height of their protectionist era, while they've reduced trade barriers and liberalized their economy now, well after they reached nuclear weapons status.


• Norms were much less explanatory than expected in the Japanese case. More practical considerations ruled their rejection of nuclear weapons, although it was noted that their technical know-how and large civilian nuclear power industry mean it would be only a matter of months if Japan decided to create nuclear weapons.


• Prestige derived from economies is balanced against prestige from nuclear weapons. Democracy vice autarky.


• There has to be a separation between the pre- and post-NPT eras. The UK and France acquired a nuclear capability, while Sweden rejected it in favor of neutrality (a sort of prestige in its own right).


• There can be unintended effects of policy, and it was suggested that one must differentiate between use of nuclear weapons vice acquisition.


• Small numbers of warheads and short timelines ("sprint" breakout capability) dominate proliferation concerns and have a disproportionate impact on world affairs.


• There was a brief discussion of perception and reaction to US government statements that reminded me of strategic communications issues raised by the long war.