In the midst of a political crisis that could spark into civil war, a timely discussion of Pakistan's history as a nuclear power took place at the Center for Strategic and International Studies last Friday.
Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, the authors of Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, an investigation into American-Pakinstani relations and the arms-trading network established by disgraced scientist AQ Khan, presented primarily a chronology of Pakistan's nuclear program and supposed American intelligence and policy failings rather than focusing on the spread of technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. I would have been more interested in the implications of the latter, but found some decent nuggets of insight amid the name-dropping and editorial opinions.
Notes from the Authors' Presentation:
- The stop/start nature of American and European relations with Pakistan have influenced the country greatly, and in fact parallel the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear program.
- After India explodes a "peaceful" nuclear bomb in 1974, the West tried to prevent Pakistan from following suit, but was ineffective.
- Once the Mullahs took power in Tehran, the Carter administration decided Pakistan could act as a potential bulwark to the Iranian threat. Nothing came of this stance, but it indicated the type of thinking that was taking place amid corridors of power.
- The Reagan administration believed that the U.S. could live with a Pakistani nuclear program, so long as it remained secret.
- During the 1980s, Western aid flowed liberally to Pakistan, but after the fall of the Soviet Union and their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the money dried up. In response, Pakistan turned to Iran, and there may have been nuclear trades in the early 1990s.
- (Partial) Chronology of Pakistan's nuclear program:
- 1978: created weapons-grade uranium
- 1986: hot test of Pakistani weapon by China at Lop Nur
- 1988: weaponized bombs for deployment on American-made F-16 fighter jets
- 1998: underground nuclear test in Lahore, in response to India's detonations
- A changing thesis in the Pakistani military (the most professional and reliable institution in the country) held that they must seek more reliable allies, as well as cash, beyond Chinese technological assistance. At one point, Pakistan tried to create a security buffer with Afghanistan and Turkey to counter India. And of course, China's aid is largely caused by their determination to keep India occupied with its north-western borders rather than its north-eastern edges with Tibet. A quote about this period: "Marketing the cash cow of uranium enrichment."
- The AQ Khan network was pitched as a defiance of the West, including a scheme to sell a ready-made bomb to Iraq that ultimately went nowhere. Iran was dissatisfied with the centrifuges Khan provided, rating them as sub-par technology. He held meetings with Syria and the Saudis, both of whom were looking for warheads. Other travel to African nations was related to attempts to decentralize the program, in terms of both storage and labor. Now-unemployed scientists from South Africa's nuclear program were approached by Khan.
- Per Benazir Bhutto, in 1993 she sought a deal with North Korea to obtain No Dong missiles for reverse engineering (the Ghauri MRBM is the No Dong, so Pakistan eventually did add North Korean missiles to their arsenal). She brought blueprints back from a trip to China, an action that had political ramifications that would later be used against her. The tone here was almost opening mocking of Bhutto, which disturbed me.
- When Libya agreed to relinquish its WMD programs and allow for international inspections in December 2003, its nuclear program was determined to have come wholesale from Pakistan.
- The authors attempted to draw links between the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and WMD proliferation, but their narrative was confusing and their evidence non-existent (the book might have more convincing proof). They believe that the focus on AQ Khan as a rogue agent outside the control of the Pakistani government was a deliberate choice to deflect suspicion from what might have been deliberate government policy. Much was made of the fact that Khan has never been directly questioned by the West.
- The Waziristan region became a haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban by 2006, as is well known. The authors asserted that despite President Musharraf's promises, there has been no de-radicalization of Pakistan – in fact, Islamist elements have been strengthened in certain areas. Pakistan is still purchasing dual-use components in large quantities, perhaps to sell. They're also poor at tracking their fissile material – as many as 40 drums of HEU might be missing.
Comments, Questions, and Answers:
In general, an extraordinary session, with experts from the U.S. government including a former ambassador to Pakistan challenging the authors' interpretation of events.
- Q: Strangeness of no red flags going up in the 1990s regarding Pakistan's proliferation. Was there some motive on the part of the U.S. government for keeping quiet? A: Not as far as they could determine.
- Comment: Nothing went in and out of Kahuta without ISI (the Pakistani intelligence service) approval. AQ Khan's movements were monitored beginning in 1999 when Musharraf took power, yet proliferation continued well after Khan's "retirement" in 2002. This was not a one man operation.
- Comment: Many holes in the evidence, leading the authors to an interpretation. Proposed that there's another way the story could make sense, closer to Musharraf's claims. Regarding access to Khan: it's not usual to grant third parties open access in nuclear cases (example of the Rosenbergs). Asked the audience to keep an open mind with regard to the two narratives available. AQ Khan was an accomplished liar unless presented with incontrovertible truth contradicting his position.
- Comment: The book assumes that U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction is both omniscient and infallible – not true. There were and are differences of opinion within the intelligence community about Pakistan's nuclear program, including a genuine belief that we didn't know what was going on.
- Comment re: accuracy. Musharraf is linked to bin Laden, yet this is contradicted by the chronology presented in Musharraf's memoir. Gul's (Pakistani general?) account of their nuclear program should not be taken as gospel. Questioned credibility of evidence.
- Q: Is part of the motivation for Pakistan's nuclear program that they are facing East, not West? Have to consider India and role of Kashmir conflict (see above for my point on China and how they've propped Pakistan up to keep India occupied).
- Comment: Uranium trade with North Korea came about in part because Pakistan couldn't pay for the technology they desired on a cash basis.
- There are limits of American influence on Pakistan's policy. How could we shift the country? Must look at role of China, coercive threat to withhold military aid, make clear distinction between Pakistani people and unpopular, illegal government. Why must the equation be Musharraf or Islamists? The two are cooperating, not adversarial.
- Q: Is Pakistan safer because of its nuclear arsenal? There was a deterrent effect in a 2001 crisis with India, but on three other occasions, nuclear weapons have heightened tensions. Not enough is known about the Pakistani or Indian arsenals.
- Comment: Reactive nature of American policy, and the power of inertia even in the face of tumultuous events.
Events remain tumultuous, of course, with Musharraf's crackdown on the legal system and opposition political parties marking his increasing unpopularity. He's been ineffective at tamping down Islamist activity, perhaps by design. Moderate forces are the ones protesting. Hopefully, this crisis will have a positive outcome, but Pakistan's nuclear weapons add to the danger.
Audio of the discussion is available at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1419/
