Political Calculations

The sensation of this election season has been John McCain's decision to ask Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska to be his running mate on the Republican presidential ticket. In the days following McCain's announcement, the blogosphere and traditional media went on a rampage, delving into Palin's personal life with unprecedented ferocity and vitriol. They were attempting to prove her unfit for national office.

Aside from distaste at their focus, which might have been more fruitfully deployed against Palin's extreme positions on abortion, gay rights, and creationism in schools (save perhaps that she never made those positions part of her efforts while governing), the feeding frenzy barreled past a huge signal of McCain's priorities for his administration: energy policy.

Palin's reputation is that of a maverick and reformer, complimenting McCain's own. In her short time in office, she took on major oil companies, contrary to the assumption that Republicans are always in the pocket of big business. She brokered a deal between multiple stakeholders, including federal, provincial, and tribal governments and businesses, to build a new gas pipeline from Alaska to the continental United States. Her time as chairman of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission gives her experience in the development and economics of oil fields, and knowledge of petroleum's limitations. Her acceptance speech at the GOP convention presented a sophisticated analysis of the linkages between energy sources and recent foreign policy crisis points.

Apart from pipelines in the Caucuses, the perennial issue of Islamic extremism in the Middle East, and Venezuelan intransigence, high oil prices have driven much of the recent economic slowdown in the United States (the other major factor being, of course, the collapse of credit markets based on risky loans). Pain at the pumps, rising transportation costs, leading to higher food prices – all of it contributes to a perception of recession and a certain level of helplessness.

Ongoing discussions within the military and foreign policy communities have convinced me that dependence on oil – the underpinning of the world economy since Nixon took American currency off the gold standard – dictates American engagement in the Middle East. We are in Iraq, we support Saudi Arabia, because they have petroleum. Our presence there aggravates factionalism and Islamic fundamentalism with tragic results. The events of September 11th, seven years ago tomorrow, showed the consequences.

Petroleum reserves are finite; estimates vary on their duration, but efforts must accelerate a transition to alternate sources of energy, with a side benefit of environmental protection. Wind power, hydroelectric, solar, hydrogen fuel cells, conversion of non-food plants to ethanol – there are many options, but the best one or mix of sources has yet to be determined.

Palin's nomination undoubtedly arose from a calculus of multiple issues. She assuages concerns of the religious right and socially conservative Republicans that McCain is too moderate. She's an outsider to the elites of Washington in a year when public opinion is disgusted with Congress. She has a record of reform against corruption, even against members of her party. She's a woman from a small town who began her political career in the PTA, appealing to middle America and certain other demographics.

But don't discount the fact of her experience with energy issues in McCain's decision. To me, it indicates that he is serious about shifting America away from petroleum. It won't happen next year or the year after that, which explains the enthusiasm for offshore drilling among Republicans. Yet eventually, in the long term, the United States should be in a much better position with regard to energy. And that will increase the flexibility of our foreign policy immensely, allowing us, perhaps, to leave the Middle East to its own devices and move onward to a brighter future.

Turmoil in Islamabad

In the midst of a political crisis that could spark into civil war, a timely discussion of Pakistan's history as a nuclear power took place at the Center for Strategic and International Studies last Friday.

Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, the authors of Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, an investigation into American-Pakinstani relations and the arms-trading network established by disgraced scientist AQ Khan, presented primarily a chronology of Pakistan's nuclear program and supposed American intelligence and policy failings rather than focusing on the spread of technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. I would have been more interested in the implications of the latter, but found some decent nuggets of insight amid the name-dropping and editorial opinions.

Notes from the Authors' Presentation:

• The stop/start nature of American and European relations with Pakistan have influenced the country greatly, and in fact parallel the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear program.


• After India explodes a "peaceful" nuclear bomb in 1974, the West tried to prevent Pakistan from following suit, but was ineffective.


• Once the Mullahs took power in Tehran, the Carter administration decided Pakistan could act as a potential bulwark to the Iranian threat. Nothing came of this stance, but it indicated the type of thinking that was taking place amid corridors of power.


• The Reagan administration believed that the U.S. could live with a Pakistani nuclear program, so long as it remained secret.


• During the 1980s, Western aid flowed liberally to Pakistan, but after the fall of the Soviet Union and their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the money dried up. In response, Pakistan turned to Iran, and there may have been nuclear trades in the early 1990s.



• (Partial) Chronology of Pakistan's nuclear program:


• 1978: created weapons-grade uranium


• 1986: hot test of Pakistani weapon by China at Lop Nur


• 1988: weaponized bombs for deployment on American-made F-16 fighter jets


• 1998: underground nuclear test in Lahore, in response to India's detonations



• A changing thesis in the Pakistani military (the most professional and reliable institution in the country) held that they must seek more reliable allies, as well as cash, beyond Chinese technological assistance. At one point, Pakistan tried to create a security buffer with Afghanistan and Turkey to counter India. And of course, China's aid is largely caused by their determination to keep India occupied with its north-western borders rather than its north-eastern edges with Tibet. A quote about this period: "Marketing the cash cow of uranium enrichment."



• The AQ Khan network was pitched as a defiance of the West, including a scheme to sell a ready-made bomb to Iraq that ultimately went nowhere. Iran was dissatisfied with the centrifuges Khan provided, rating them as sub-par technology. He held meetings with Syria and the Saudis, both of whom were looking for warheads. Other travel to African nations was related to attempts to decentralize the program, in terms of both storage and labor. Now-unemployed scientists from South Africa's nuclear program were approached by Khan.



• Per Benazir Bhutto, in 1993 she sought a deal with North Korea to obtain No Dong missiles for reverse engineering (the Ghauri MRBM is the No Dong, so Pakistan eventually did add North Korean missiles to their arsenal). She brought blueprints back from a trip to China, an action that had political ramifications that would later be used against her. The tone here was almost opening mocking of Bhutto, which disturbed me.



• When Libya agreed to relinquish its WMD programs and allow for international inspections in December 2003, its nuclear program was determined to have come wholesale from Pakistan.



• The authors attempted to draw links between the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and WMD proliferation, but their narrative was confusing and their evidence non-existent (the book might have more convincing proof). They believe that the focus on AQ Khan as a rogue agent outside the control of the Pakistani government was a deliberate choice to deflect suspicion from what might have been deliberate government policy. Much was made of the fact that Khan has never been directly questioned by the West.



• The Waziristan region became a haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban by 2006, as is well known. The authors asserted that despite President Musharraf's promises, there has been no de-radicalization of Pakistan – in fact, Islamist elements have been strengthened in certain areas. Pakistan is still purchasing dual-use components in large quantities, perhaps to sell. They're also poor at tracking their fissile material – as many as 40 drums of HEU might be missing.

Comments, Questions, and Answers:

In general, an extraordinary session, with experts from the U.S. government including a former ambassador to Pakistan challenging the authors' interpretation of events.

• Q: Strangeness of no red flags going up in the 1990s regarding Pakistan's proliferation. Was there some motive on the part of the U.S. government for keeping quiet? A: Not as far as they could determine.



• Comment: Nothing went in and out of Kahuta without ISI (the Pakistani intelligence service) approval. AQ Khan's movements were monitored beginning in 1999 when Musharraf took power, yet proliferation continued well after Khan's "retirement" in 2002. This was not a one man operation.



• Comment: Many holes in the evidence, leading the authors to an interpretation. Proposed that there's another way the story could make sense, closer to Musharraf's claims. Regarding access to Khan: it's not usual to grant third parties open access in nuclear cases (example of the Rosenbergs). Asked the audience to keep an open mind with regard to the two narratives available. AQ Khan was an accomplished liar unless presented with incontrovertible truth contradicting his position.



• Comment: The book assumes that U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction is both omniscient and infallible – not true. There were and are differences of opinion within the intelligence community about Pakistan's nuclear program, including a genuine belief that we didn't know what was going on.



• Comment re: accuracy. Musharraf is linked to bin Laden, yet this is contradicted by the chronology presented in Musharraf's memoir. Gul's (Pakistani general?) account of their nuclear program should not be taken as gospel. Questioned credibility of evidence.



• Q: Is part of the motivation for Pakistan's nuclear program that they are facing East, not West? Have to consider India and role of Kashmir conflict (see above for my point on China and how they've propped Pakistan up to keep India occupied).



• Comment: Uranium trade with North Korea came about in part because Pakistan couldn't pay for the technology they desired on a cash basis.



• There are limits of American influence on Pakistan's policy. How could we shift the country? Must look at role of China, coercive threat to withhold military aid, make clear distinction between Pakistani people and unpopular, illegal government. Why must the equation be Musharraf or Islamists? The two are cooperating, not adversarial.



• Q: Is Pakistan safer because of its nuclear arsenal? There was a deterrent effect in a 2001 crisis with India, but on three other occasions, nuclear weapons have heightened tensions. Not enough is known about the Pakistani or Indian arsenals.



• Comment: Reactive nature of American policy, and the power of inertia even in the face of tumultuous events.

Events remain tumultuous, of course, with Musharraf's crackdown on the legal system and opposition political parties marking his increasing unpopularity. He's been ineffective at tamping down Islamist activity, perhaps by design. Moderate forces are the ones protesting. Hopefully, this crisis will have a positive outcome, but Pakistan's nuclear weapons add to the danger.



Audio of the discussion is available at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1419/

Post-Election Thoughts

Although I usually find myself disinterested or actively put off by Congressional politics, the aftermath of last week's election has been fascinating. I was hoping that Republicans could maintain control over the Senate, although that hope didn't allow me to vote for Virginia's Republican candidate for Senator, the embarrassing George Allen, who self-destructed in the last months of the campaign. I also felt I couldn't vote for eventual victor Jim Webb, so for the first time, I went Independent Green. Why must Virginia field such unappealing candidates? Back when Oliver North battled Chuck Robb, I was grateful that Marshall Coleman ran as an independent candidate and provided a choice I could endorse. With Webb's victory, the Senate went to the Democrats and a reorganization of party leadership began.

Senator Trent Lott's resurrection as Minority Whip was analyzed by some as an indication that the Republican party is serious about getting business done with the Democratic majority. Lott's remarks four years ago endorsing segregation were appalling, yet every politician has skeletons in their closet. And the mood of the country could shift towards Republicans if the Democrats are seen as obstructionist or unable to accomplish their few campaign promises. Lott's skills in developing compromise solutions to tough issues and building consensus support could be invaluable in the coming term, so long as he truly regrets the message behind his blunder, not just its results.

The more fascinating story was in the House of Representatives, with Speaker-elect Nancy Pelosi's unsuccessful quest to elevate Rep. John Murtha to the post of Majority Leader. Murtha's reputation is as besmirched as they come – pork barrel spending, cozy ties to lobbyists and industry, and a damning 1980 video where Murtha half-heartedly rejects Abscam bribes yet leaves the window open for future graft ("I want to deal with you guys awhile before I make any transactions at all, period. After we've done some business, well, then I might change my mind. ... I'm going to tell you this. If anybody can do it – I'm not B.S.-ing you fellows – I can get it done my way. There's no question about it."). Given that many of the electorate expressed dissatisfaction with the ethics of the previous Republican-led Congress, and that the Democrats beat the reform drum as one of their main campaign planks, Pelosi's conduct appears inexplicable and harmful to her future efforts.

Murtha famously called for a withdrawal from Iraq before other members of his party took up the anti-war cause, so it's possible that Pelosi felt his position on that contentious issue would outweigh his sketchy reputation. However, her efforts to tie plum committee positions to support for Murtha has alienated her fellow Democratic Representatives and bodes poorly for her leadership style.

My questions at this point involve the reactions of the Democratic faithful – are they paying attention to this scintillating drama? How do they weigh the relative importance of Iraq versus corruption with regard to Murtha? And now that Murtha's been defeated by Steny Hoyer of Maryland, will Pelosi be damaged by the fallout? If the faithful decide she's compromised, or the vast swathe of moderate American voters is taken aback, the Presidential and Congressional elections in 2008 could prove this shift in power to be an anomaly.

As a moderate myself, I'm hoping that Congress is able to compromise on domestic issues and that newly nominated Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is able to capitalize on his time with the Iraq Study Group will allow him to adjust U.S. defense policy in a way that stabilizes the volatile situation in the Persian Gulf.

And as ever, I'm wishing that both political parties could be better than they are.

Any way you slice it, the next two years will be momentous ones for American domestic politics and foreign policy.

[transferred from a now-defunct location]

No Peace Dividend

I'd been skeptical of the conclusions drawn in this report ("The Human Security Report 2005"), which were publicized at the end of 2005. For one thing, the excerpts I read didn't seem to take certain types of violence into account - terrorism, insurrection, etc. For another, the methodology described seemed less than rigorous. Fred Kaplan has delved into these issues in an article on Slate. It's good reading, and elaborates on the perils of trying to draw conclusions from incomplete or narrow sets of data.

Conflicts in Africa and the Middle East have not gone away, although Latin America has certainly gotten more stable since the end of the Soviet Union. Even there, though, there are rivalries and competing interests that make military action a possibility today. The Balkans are more stable than they were in the early and mid-1990s. Asia has not seen war for a while, but North Korea's precarious economic situation and the multitudes squabbling over possession of the Spratly Islands could change that at any time.

I've been pondering writing about Iran's nuclear ambitions in the context of their larger ballistic missile and WMD programs. Watch this space.

[transferred from a now-defunct location]

On Iraq

I'd been mulling over thoughts about the situation in Iraq, but then a friend linked to this piece by Joseph Lieberman and now I don't have to.

Our Troops Must Stay: America can't abandon 27 million Iraqis to 10,000 terrorists.


[transferred from a now-defunct location]

September 11th and Iraq

An article in today’s Washington Post (Antiwar Activists Decry Media's Role in Promoting Pentagon Event), covers objections to news media support for a Department of Defense event “to remember the victims of the Sept. 11 attacks and to support the troops in Iraq.” The article contained a quote from an anti-war activist: “Because they're promoting a lie, that the war in Iraq had anything to do with September 11."

Did Iraq’s leadership, did Saddam Hussein, meet with Osama bin Laden and help plan the September 11th attacks? No. However, Saddam’s hostile regime was directly responsible for the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, one of al Qaeda’s spurs to action. Iraq also continued to rouse Iran’s defensive impulses, causing further build-up of weapons in the region. And Iraq did flout United Nations sanctions to cooperate with weapons inspection teams, as well as international norms prohibiting assassination of national leaders. Iraq was a problem that was not going away prior to September 11th. Instead, leading nations around the world were allowing Iraq to slide back into civilized society, through their inaction over Iraq’s continued and escalating defiance of post-Gulf War rules.

After September 11th, the Bush administration decided to unseat the Taliban in Afghanistan – a worthy cause for reasons other than disrupting al Qaeda operations. Since the Taliban took power in the mid-1990s, they had systematically laid waste to human rights, especially with regard to women, and irreplaceable cultural artifacts. They were barbarians, and it is to the world’s shame that inertia allowed their rule to continue as long as it did. But Afghanistan is only one piece of the Middle East puzzle, a larger problem that involves numerous countries, authoritarian regimes, religious influences, economic stagnation, and the need to educate and employ a restless populace. For years, America was content to support the Saudi monarchy so long as oil continued to flow. That the house of Saud needed to hand over their mosques to Sunni fundamentalists to make the deal palatable was none of our concern. Until two towers collapsed, a wing of the Pentagon crumbled, and a plane’s wreckage burned in a Pennsylvania field.

Of course oil is the basis of American interests in the region. Were it not for oil, the fuel that drives the world economy, the Middle East would hold our attention as much as sub-Saharan Africa, which is to say not much at all. But a geological roll of the dice gifted the area with vital resources, and as preeminent nation in the world, the United States must ensure continued access to oil. To do that, a broader American strategy was put into place, one that could address both the growth of Islamic dissidents, the pool where al Qaeda finds recruits, and also the delicate political-military balance of the region.

Looking at the region after the fall of the Taliban, the next major nexus point was obviously Iraq. Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait in 1990, had used chemical weapons on minority Kurds in the late 1980s, had invaded Iran early in the decade, leading to years of warfare and attrition. Negotiations had proven fruitless due to lack Iraqi cooperation – there was no information to indicate that the regime wanted to change internally, and their past history of evading arms control restrictions and creating illegal networks to funnel weapons into the country meant that any proclamation about disarmament was eyed with skepticism.

Given the horrid way the Ba’athist regime treated the Iraqi population, I cannot regret that they were overthrown. That insurgents and malcontents from the former elites proceeded to institute guerilla war was not unexpected, and better planning could certainly have minimized some of the post-invasion bombings and other disturbances. But now that the U.S. is involved in the country, sponsor of a new democratic government, we cannot afford to pull out before stability is achieved. Were we to do so, then the Osama bin Laden’s and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s of the world would sweep in and create another Taliban-era Afghanistan, a place where religious fundamentalists could plot their next attack on the degenerate West.

The war in Iraq definitely had something to do with September 11 – those attacks were America’s wake up call that the status quo in the Middle East could not be permitted to continue.

[transferred from a now-defunct location]

Karl Rove

Honestly? I agree with his recent statements on democratic behavior after the attacks of September 11th. I remember thinking, that horrible day, how glad I was that Al Gore wasn't President, based on Clinton's ineffectiveness where attacks on the United States was concerned. And as the year progressed, I became even more convinced that George W. Bush's policy was correct. Had Gore been President, the Taliban would still be in power in Afghanistan, and al-Qa'ida would live within their borders to attack Western interests with impunity.

Which is not to say that the Bush administrations policies haven't been problematic at times. But I cannot support those who feel that peace at all costs is a valid course of action.

[transferred from a now-defunct location]

Conspiracy Theories

I don't believe in them, most of the time.

http://www.slate.com/id/2121212/

Conspiracy Theories

If you liked The Da Vinci Code, you'll love the Downing Street Memo.
By Christopher Hitchens

[transferred from a now-defunct location]